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ABSTRACT
An Analysis of Medical Futility Dilemmas
by
Eloise A. Powell
Dr. Craig Walton, Examination Committee Chair

Professor o f Ethics and Policy Studies
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Medical futility has caused serious dilemmas in the fields o f medicine and
bioethics recently. It has become more confusing due to the use o f high technological
equipment and medicines that are given to prolong life and interrupt the natural
process o f death.
Therefore, we have created a dilemma o f medical futility. Until recently, not
many steps have been taken to address futile or inappropriate care that is given to a
large number o f the population, but with healthcare costs rismg substantially, the time
has come when these issues must be addressed.
This thesis will include a short history o f medical futility, the ethics o f futility
and how ethical prmciples are used in decision making. Patient rights and advance
directives will be addressed and case law will be presented.
Finally, policy recommendations wûl be presented and the reason why these
recommendations would be advantageous to the public will be discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
“There is an appointed time for everything, and a time for every affair under
the heavens. A time to be bom, and a time to die”(l). Yet, in the year 2000, the
appointed time for a natural death to occur has become a controversial issue due to
the use o f futile treatment in the terminally ill, the elderly with multisystem failure,
those in a persistent vegetative state, and neonates with no hope o f survival. Life is
being prolonged and sustained by artificial means due to the advancement o f medical
technology in the twentieth century. There are clinical, ethical and legal problems
that exist when a life is being prolonged, as it is in the above populations, due to the
use o f advanced medical technology. I will present in this thesis how and why
medical futility became an issue and where this issue stands in the year 2000. I argue
that medically futile care should not be provided to the terminally iU, those in a
persistent vegetative state, the elderly in multi-system failure and neonates with no
hope o f survival. I will make recommendations with the hope that public policy can
be reformed or initiated to alleviate the problems that have occurred regardmg the use
o f medically futile care.
For several years, the term ‘medical futility’ has caused and is still causing a
serious dilemma in the health care field. The definition o f futility has remained
elusive and this problem has been and coutumes to be a serious and volatile topic o f
debate and controversy among physicians, bioethicists, other health care professionals
and members o f our society.
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While the science o f medicine was rapidly advancing, the area o f medical
futility became quite a thought-provoking issue in 1983. The increased use of
advanced medical technology such as ventilators, pressure monitoring devices, renal
dialysis, organ transplantation, and a vast array o f medicines including vasopressors
(medicines which increase the contractility o f the heart) were used either one at a time
or in combination to prolong life and replace the natural process o f death.
Four cases will be presented here to exemplify medical futility in the 1990’s.
Two cases discuss the futility o f care involving adults and two cases discuss neonates.
One case portrays futility where the family member wants everything done in spite o f
the recommendation and prognosis of the physician. The other case portrays the
physician wishing everythmg done in spite o f the presence o f a living will and the
knowledge that there was no chance of survival. These two case histories were taken
from the author’s personal experience. The other two cases involve neonates: one
case where the physicians again insisted everything be done in spite o f the parents’
wishes and the other where both physicians and parents agreed nothing should be
done due to the condition o f the infant.
The first case exemplifying medical futility treatment occiuring in the 1990’s
involves a seventy six year old woman who had been comatose fijr five years. She
was also a bilateral amputee (both legs amputated) due to long term diabetes. This
patient had a history o f cardiovascular disease and end stage renal failure which
required hemodialysis (the process o f cleansing the blood o f accumulated waste
products) at least three times a week to sustain life. Even though the prognosis given
by the physicians was poor, with no hope o f recovery, her son wanted ‘everything
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done’ to sustain life. The patient was resuscitated five times, each time when her
heart stopped. Her condition became worse with each resuscitation, until finally the
fifth resuscitation failed, and the patient expired. The son filed a lawsuit against the
physicians and the hospital for malpractice, but the physicians and the hospital were
both exonerated. In this case, the nect o f kin was using his relationship with his
mother to force the physician to provide futile care.
Another side of the coin is that case when the physician is the person who
wants ‘everything done’ in spite o f family wishes or the presence o f a living will.
Consider the case of a seventy-eight year old male admitted to the hospital who was
alert and oriented but with multiple medical problems. The patient’s heart stopped
and he was resuscitated in spite o f the presence of a living will. The patient was
transferred to the intensive care unit and was in a comatose state for two weeks. The
family wished to withdraw life support and have the living will honored, but the
physician refused. The family eventually found a physician who would honor the
living will. Life support was removed and the patient died within two hours. This
case involved the physician using paternalism to provide futile care to an elder person
with no hope o f survival.
Medical futility is also present with the advent o f the specialty o f neonatology,
(care o f the infant within the first thirty days of life). Many years ago, those infants
who were bom prematurely or with severe congenital defects died shortly after birth;
now, some o f these infants are kept alive indefinitely and suffer while they receive
futile care.
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Consider the case o f a twenty-five week fetus, bom weighing no more that
one poimd, and with a very slight chance o f survival. The baby was placed on life
support and the parents waited a reasonable length o f time (two months) before
requesting that life support be withdrawn since there was no change in the baby’s
condition. Yet the physicians refused the request, stating that the baby would
recover. Instead o f respecting the parents’ wishes, the baby was poked, prodded, and
resuscitated time and again, always coming back, but the condition worsening each
time. Eventually this baby did not survive a final resuscitation and the parents’
nightmare was over. This case was portrayed in a book written by the parents o f the
infant.
On the other hand, there was a baby bom with anencephaly (a condition in
which some portion o f the brain stem is present but the cerebral cortex, the largest
part o f the brain, is severely underdeveloped or is absent). Only one eye was present
in the middle o f the head (a condition known as cyclops), a slit representing a nose,
and a slit representing the mouth. Physicians, nurses, and the parents all agreed that
any medical treatment would be futile and the baby was kept warm and hydrated until
her death a few hours later. This case occurred m a Catholic hospital and withholding
treatment was considered ethically and morally acceptable. I was involved in the
decision making process with the parents and medical staff. This last case is truly
how families and the medical profession can woik together for the best interests o f
the patient
So, how and when did we, as the medical profession, begin trying to prolong
the lives o f those whose prognosis was so grave or non-existent?
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Some idea of medical fiitility was acknowledged even in the time of
Hippocrates. He noted that, “the functions o f medicine are threefold: to relieve pain,
to reduce the violence o f disease and to refrain from trying to cure those whose
disease has conquered, acknowledging that in such cases, medicine is powerless” (2).
For centuries, medicine offered little in the way of successful therapies, and
the central function o f medicine consisted o f care rather than cure. In this country,
American culture accepted the fact that death was the natural process that occurred
when someone was grievously ill. Unfortunately, with the advent o f high technology
medicine, American culture has decided that seemingly unlimited life is an option and
some people want “everything done” to prolong life even if it is to no avail (3).
Therefore, this dilemma o f medical futility has been heightened far beyond its earlier
scope.
Physicians have been taught in medical school “to do everything” and many
consider themselves a failure, especially interns and residents, if a patient does not
survive an illness. Even though some disagree, physicians are being encouraged to
limit the use o f powerfril therapies (such as resuscitation, ventilation, and dialysis)
requested by patients and their surrogates. However, while this type o f medicine is
being discouraged. Emergency Medical Services must, unless documentation is
provided, resuscitate anyone whose breathing has ceased or whose heart has stopped,
regardless o f the patient’s wishes. So some futile or inappropriate care is given in the
field, in aU states, by law.
While using all the advanced technologr medicine has to offer, medical costs
have risen substantially since 1960, and have caused a great concern among the
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population and members o f government. In I960, national health care expenditures
were only 3.5% o f the gross national product, and by 1989; the cost had risen to
11.6% o f the gross national product. These prices have risen at a far greater rate than
any other consumer prices and increased again after 1989. Now, according to a study
done by the National Center for Health Statistics in 1992, the cost for health care in
the United States in the year 1990, had reached $666 billion a year.(4) According to a
study by the Healthcare Finance Administration published in Modem Healthcare on
September 14,1998, the projection for the cost o f healthcare will increase from $1.5
trillion in 1998 to $2.13 trillion in the year 2007.(5) These figures may prompt a
debate concerning non-beneficial or futile treatment to those who have a minimal
quality o f life, (e.g. those in a persistent vegetative state).
Statement o f the Problem and Recommendations
Inappropriate or futile care is provided to a large portion o f the population, yet
policymakers have not really addressed it. Instead o f addressing futile care at the
bedside, it has become a problem that has been taken into the courtroom. Families
are demanding inappropriate care and physicians are providing it because members o f
society have come to expect it and/or threaten lawsuits if it is not provided. On the
other hand, some physicians provide inappropriate care because they have a need to
use everything available in medicine to save a life if they feel a moral obligation to
provide this care. Medical schools also play a part in this dilemma because they are
guilty o f not providing a curriculum that addresses the way physicians should deal
with the death process. Communication, especially m this area o f death, should be
provided because it is o f utmost importance among the health care team.
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The media play an important role in the futility debate. Medical programs on
television and those shown in movie theaters impress upon the public that if a cardiac
arrest occurs, one shock with a defibrillator may bring a person back to life although
this fact is highly unlikely.
In another case, the press depicted a former police officer who had been “in a
coma” for eighteen years and miraculously began talking to his family continuously
for twenty-four hours. Coma is defined as a state o f profound unconsciousness firom
which the patient cannot be aroused even by painfiil stimuli. While the press reported
the patient had been comatose, they showed a picture in the newspaper o f this
gentleman sitting in a wheelchair while someone instructed him to do some sort o f
project. A truly comatose person does not respond to instructions. Awakening firom
a comatose state is an extreme rarity. Obviously the media should investigate a case
of this magnitude more carefully before it publishes something in the newspaper. A
story like this can give so many people false hope when there is none.
All hospitals should establish a specific definition of futility and standard o f
care should be addressed. In 1987, the Hastings Center provided guidelines to
provide an ethical firamework for analyzmg problem cases involving long-term life
supporting technology, ventilators and dialysis, emergency interventions
(cardiopulmonary resuscitation), nutrition and hydration o f terminal patients,
antibiotics and other life-sustaining medication, palliative care and pam relief. Some
physicians have used these guidelines, but many have not, nor do many know o f any
guidelines m existence.
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Physicians, nurses, ethicists, attorneys, poKcymakers and members o f the
community should be involved in a process, not unlike a grass roots movement or a
community decision, to decide what definition, guidelines and policies will be
established since the issues debated are so very serious and involve not only their
lives, but the lives of all o f us.
Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this thesis is not to address rationing o r withholding care firom
those who cannot afford to pay. It is to provide information and insight to advance
my argument regarding the ethics and policies concerning futile and inappropriate
care that is provided to the terminally ill, those in a persistent vegetative state, the
elderly in multi-system failure, those newborns o f extremely low birth-weight and
infants who have birth defects not compatible with life. The other purpose is to make
policy recommendations addressing this issue.
Many o f us who are involved with families trying to come to a resolution
regarding the care o f their loved ones have watched them agonize over the decisions
that must be made. Most o f the staff presently working m acute care or transitional
care hospitals wish there could be definitive policies regarding futile care as they
watch patients suffer during the last days o f their lives. Yet there is no national
agreement as to define ‘futility’ or what ethics or which policies should be followed.
There are problems in the health care field regardmg futile or inappropriate
care that need to be addressed in the very near future. Is the medical profession going
to contmue to provide fife-sustaining treatment to those patients who have no chance
o f survival or no quality o f fife? Futile or niqiptoptiate care is not only expensive.
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but an atmosphere o f distrust is created among families, surrogates and physicians
when there is indecision or lack o f communication regarding treatment o f their loved
one.
To advance discussion o f this issue, this thesis will explore the issue of
medical futility as it is used to prolong the lives of those in a persistent vegetative
state, those with a terminal illness, the elderly with multisystem failure and neonates
with ho hope o f survival and the reasons why this type o f care should not be
provided. I will first examine the problem o f defining ‘futility’ and consider the
ethical issues involved. It will also touch lightly on neonates who weigh under
SOOgrams and neonates, who are bom with a birth defect that is incompatible with
life, then consider case law on these questions, and will conclude with what should be
guideline recommendations.
Chapter One gives a short history leading up to the time futility became an
issue and touches on the ways different cultures and religions deal with futility. It
will also include statements by Hippocrates and Plato stating why the lives o f those
who are terminally ill should not be attended. Chapter Two will discuss definitions
o f futility and work toward a simple, usable and defensible de&iition. Literature will
be reviewed and arguments for and against providing futile treatment will also be
presented.
Chapter Three will be devoted to patients’ rights, including their legal right to
refuse treatment. It will include the reason why advance directives became law and
why the use and abuse o f thMe dhectives has become an hnportant part o f health care
today. It will also considerthefactthatonly ten to fifteen percent o f the present
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population have advance directives, and will discuss why these directives are not
more widely used and whether or not or how they should be used.
Chapter Four will address case law. Several cases will be reviewed along
with the reasons why these cases were presented to the court. Also covered in this
chapter will be some o f the reasons why physicians are pressured to provide futile or
inappropriate care to patients and why families and surrogates demand care that is
beyond curing a family member. It will also portray associations (one o f which is the
Americans with Disabilities Association) who try to promote their causes by
impinging on the rights o f patients and their families.
Chapter Five will present conclusions and provide policy recommendations.
Some futility policies are in existence at the present time in the United States.
However, due to the sensitivity of the subject o f futility, the use o f these policies is
not widespread.
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CHAPTER ONE
HISTORY OF MEDICAL FUTILITY
Daniel Callahan, the noted bioethicist refers to medical fiitility as the
“problem without a name”(l). Yet, this problem rears its ugly head almost daily in
hospitals and extended care facilities throughout the country. Not only does this issue
occur in the adult population, but also with infants in the neonatal intensive care unit
Medical fiitility became a thought-provoking issue as early as 1983 when the
Superior Court o f Los Angeles ruled in favor o f two physicians whose patient
suffered a cardiac arrest after surgery. The patient was in a comatose state and placed
on a ventilator. Five days after his cardiac arrest, the patient’s condition was deemed
irreversible and with the permission o f his wife, the ventilator was discontinued.
However, the patient remained in a comatose state and a few days later his wife
requested and gave the physicians written permission to discontinue nutrition and
hydration. The patient received supportive care and died within six days. The reason
the case went to court was to determine if the physicians were guilty o f murder and
conspiracy to commit murder (2). The court ruled that the conduct o f the physicians
was “one o f omission rather than an affirmation...There is no criminal liability for
failure to act unless there is a legal duty to act.. A physician has no duty to continue
treatment once it has been proven to be meffoctive. Although there may be a duty to
provide lifè-sustamîng machinery in the immediate aftermath o f a cardiopulmonary
arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once it has become futile in the opinion o f

12
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qualified personnel. .. .No precise guidelines as to when or how these decisions
should be made can be provided by this court since this determination is essentially a
medical one to be made at a time and on the basis o f facts which will be unique to
each case”(3). This decision was made in favor o f the patient since no amount of
medical care would save his life. At least here, the Court saw a clear case o f futility.
How did medical futility find a place in our culture? There was no such
problem in the world o f primitive man, even though that culture did practice some
form of medicine, which at that time was combined with magic. They believed that
illness was caused by a supernatural force. Primitive man was knowledgeable in the
art o f using plants and herbs to relieve pain or to help with other symptomatology.
They also knew how to set fiactures, even though nothing was known o f anatomy or
science. Since medical knowledge was so very limited at that time, the problem o f
medical futility did not exist then or for many centuries (4). So, let us take a short
journey in the history o f medicine to find how medical technology evolved at first
very slowly and then recently very rapidly when medical futility became a problem.
Medicine has always existed in the culture o f man; for «cample, in 2500 BC,
the Egyptians were treating bums with tannic acid and using compression to stop
bleeding. In Babylonia and in Egypt, the use o f surgical instruments to perform
Cesarean sections to deliver babies has been documented. Treating fiactures
belonged to the hidian culture in 900 BC, and m 300 BC the Chinese mvented
acupuncture. One physician even used some form o f anesthesia for surgical
procedures (5). According to Hippocratic medicme in the Greek culture, physicians
should use all the senses to make a diagnosis, and Aristotle encouraged the use o f
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observation and experimentation to develop a scientific basis for study. Hippocrates
and Plato wrote concerning the futility o f care in certain cases. Hippocrates
admonished physicians to acknowledge when effi)rts will probably fail: “whenever
therefore a man suffers from an ill which is too strong for the means at the disposal of
medicine, he surely must not even expect that it be overcome by medicme.” He
further warned the physicians “in words too strong for modem taste that to attempt
futile treatment is to display ignorance that is ‘allied to madness’”(6).
Plato states in The Republic that the “asclepian physician did not prescribe
medicine to pamper a disease. For those whose bodies were always in a state o f inner
sickness he did not attempt to prescribe a regime...to make their life a
m isery.. .Medicine was not intended for them and they should not be treated even if
they were richer than Midas”(7).
Socrates also argued against using medicme for those who were elderly or in a
terminal condition.
His [Socrates] objective to [intensive] treatment...that it requires
the patient to give himself over substantially and permanently to the
management o f his disease and so, in large measure, to give up the
normal productive pursuits that characterize his prior life. Such a
person, he says (407el2,408b 12), would benefit [lusitelein] ndther
himse lf nor Other people by his mode o f life; the treatment would

lengthen his life but also make it a very bad one (cf$07db-7), and it
is an abuse o f the art o f medicme to use it for that end. He should be
allowed to die a natural death untreated (8).
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The Romans excelled in the field o f public health. Two men, Celsus and
Galen, made major contributions to the history o f medicine. Celsus wrote books on
the subject o f surgery and was the first person to use a form of casting material to
stabilize fractures. Galen made his contribution in the field of anatomy dissecting
animals. Many o f his contributions were in error due to the method he used (9).
Medical schools were established in the 8* century in Italy. The Islamic
culture established hospitals in the 12***century. The first anatomy text was written
during the Renaissance period, and as a result, sinrgery became less barbaric. The 17‘*‘
century is noted for the discovery o f the circulatory system by William Harvey and
the invention o f the microscope by Leewenhoek. Medical schools also flourished
dining this period. The 18* century saw the use o f a vaccine made from a cow and
injected into a human to prevent a person from acquiring the disease o f smallpox.
The sciences o f microbiology and bacteriology were developed during the 19*
century and the use of ether as an anesthetic during surgical procedures made these
procedures safer and longer. Although these procedures were safer and longer, a
number o f deaths still occurred due to the unsanitary conditions in which they were
performed. A physician named Semmelwiss, who practiced obstetrics in Europe,
realized that childbirth fever was due to the fact that hands were not being washed
before a delivery. When hand-washing was used the mfection rate dropped almost
immediately. At the same tnne, a scientist in the United States by the name o f Lister
also realized dirty mstruments and dirty hands were causing problems following
surgical procedures and started using a technique o f washing hands and mstruments
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in a liquid substance called phenol. Infections following surgery and in the hospital
wards dropped drastically (10).
While substantial progress was made during the 18* and 19* centuries, 20*
century medicine progressed at a more rapid rate. With the use o f various vaccines,
the diseases o f smallpox, diphtheria, and polio were virtually wiped out. Antibiotics
came on the scene in the 1920’s but were scarce at the time. But, by the I960’s, the
use o f penicillin and sulfa drugs worked miracles never before seen in the medical
world (11).
In the 1960’s, cardiopulmonary resuscitation also became a method to save
lives, albeit not many. Basic life support, which included compressing the chest and
using mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, extended into advanced cardiac life support
which implemented the use of drugs and breathing tubes to «(tend a patient’s life.
Ventilators or respirators, which were an extension o f the iron lung used
during the days o f the polio epidemic, were being used during surgery or times when
a patient was unable to breathe spontaneously. Vasopressors were now the drugs
used in patients who had heart disease and were also used in cardiopulmonary
resuscitation. Coronary angioplasty and coronary artery bypass surgery could fix the
diseased vessels o f the heart. Renal dialysis now became a player in extending the
lifespan in those patients with end-stage renal disease. Organ transplantation also
flourished and extended a person’s lifetime, if only for a few years. Never before
could human life be extended for prolonged periods o f time!
Now one can begm to visualize a complication: m the early days o f medicme,
there was nothing one could do to extend the lifespan. Since there was no cure for
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many diseases, many died at a yoxmg age from appendicitis, pneumonia, and strep
throat. Those with a terminal illness, low birth-weight infants, severely deformed
infants and the elderly with multisystem failure were allowed to die a dignified death.
Now in the 20* century, almost any combination of medicines or procedures can be
used to extend life for a prolonged period o f time to the above mentioned populations.
Not only has advanced technology played a part in extending life, the
American culture has denied the process o f death and it almost seems that life can go
on forever (12). We want everything done to prolong life, no matter what the cost.
Some cultures do not wish their population to suffer or to prolong their lives if
they cannot function, so they agree to do nothing to extend that life and permit them
to die a dignified death. Many non-western cultures seem to accept death more
readily than those in the west. The Afiican culture integrates children with adults in
funeral preparations so they are more comfortable with the death process. The
Japanese think that death is beautiful. This thought is closely linked to Buddhism,
which regards death as the final stage in the continuum o f life (13).
The Netherlands is the exception in western culture with regard to their
acceptance o f death. The Dutch accept euthanasia, mercy killing and the right to die.
The reason for this thinking is that while 37% of the Dutch clann to be Roman
Catholic, two-thirds o f this population are not connected with a specific type o f
religion (14).
Clearly, religious aspects o f futility should be addressed. According to the
Jewish tradition in medieval tunes, a rabbinical commentary allowed the removal of
anything hindering the soul’s departure. This ^ l i e s only when a terminally ill
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patient is expected to die within three days. While it is not permitted to speed a
person’s death, nothing need be done to continue life in that state. On the other hand,
in strict law, one must not do anything to hasten death but do everything to prolong
life. Today in reform Judaism, Rabbi Soloman B. Frehof, the leading Reform
authority on ethical issues, states that a “physician is not duty bound to force a patient
to live a few days or hours. Thus, the physician may remove impediments to death
such as artificial feeding”(15). In other words, the physician is not really hastening
the death, he has simply ceased efforts to delay it. So a dichotomy exists in the
Jewish tradition, the orthodox rabbis cannot sanction “pulling the plug’ while the
conservative and reform rabbis think differently.
The Catholic religion states that there is a right to die peacefully with human
and Christian dignity. It absolves Catholic physicians fi’om an obligation to use
heroic measures on terminally ill patients. “When inevitable death is imminent in
spite o f the means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse
forms o f treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation
oflifo so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not
interrupted. In such cases, the doctor has no reason to reproach himself with failing
to help the person in danger”(I6).
Many o f the Protestant denommations in the United States express the right to
die with dignity. The Islamic tradition states “that when a person is old, very sick or
has lost sentience, the doctor should not extend life needlessly, since such symptoms
are a sign that God has willed death”(17).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

19

Our exploration o f the history o f medicine comes to an end, and medical
science continues to advance rapidly as we enter the twenty first century. Medical
futility continues to cause controversy and remains a dilemma since many cannot
agree on a definition o f this term and continue to treat cases that are considered futile.
A definition o f futility and the ethics o f futility will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ETHICS OF FUTILITY
Literature concerning the subject of fiitility has dramatically increased since
the passage o f the Patient Self-Determination Act in 1991. Right to die issues such as
withholding and withdrawing life support have also become prominent in the United
States. A debate has evolved around these issues and the medically futile care given
to premature infants and those with severe anomalies (abnormalities), the elderly with
multisystem failure, and those who are in a terminal state. While some authors use
the term ‘futility’ in their writings, others shy away from the term, stating that the
concept o f futility is too nebulous.
Ann Alpers and Bernard Lo state that futility is not just a medical issue (I).
Indeed this is a true statement, because there are many facets to the term ‘futility’.
These include the medical, economic, ethical and moral aspects o f futility. In this
chapter o f the thesis, I will discuss the definition o f ‘futility’ and the problem o f
making futility judgments. I will also focus on the ethical principles used in
judgments about futile care.
1. Definition:

How can one define the concept o f futility? Although many clinicians may be
unable to defoie this concept, they recognize it when they see it. These clinicians as
well as members o f the nursing profession know fiitile care and the term ‘futility’ not
only fir>m instinct, but also fixim their years o f experience and «cpertise. According
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to David F. Kelly, a professor at Duquesne University and author o f the book. Critical
Care Ethics, the best definition o f medical futility is that o f Stuart J. Younger, MD.
Younger suggests that ‘medical futility’ may be defined in many different
ways, but his definition is stated thus:
“The treatment is clearly fiitüe if it will fail in strictly physiological terms.
The dialysis will not clear the blood, the vasopressor will not better the blood
pressure, electric cardioversion will not start the heart, arrhythmia control
(medications that control an erratic heartbeat) will not stop the fibrillation (a
quivering heart). Or a treatment may be called futile if, while it works in the direct or
local sense, it does not postpone death even by a few minutes. The cardioversion
does start the heart, but the heart stops again immediately and this continues each
time it is done. The dialysis does clear the blood, but since the patient is immediately
moribund from the cardiac arrest, the dialysis does not postpone death from another
cause”(2). Kelly argues that if the criteria presented above are those o f futility, then
medical futility does indeed exist.
In his article, “Medical Futility”, Steven Miles, a physician and ethicist, also
provisionally defines ‘medical futility’ as a therapy that is o f no value to the patient
(3). The Hastings Center guidelines concur with Younger’s and Miles’s definition
stating that if a treatment has no physiological benefit, it should not be provided (4).
These definitions are clearly physiological in nature.
hi this thesis, the definition o f medical futility is also strictly physiological in
nature. If a treatment cannot cure or provide a benefit to the following population,
the terminally HI, the elderly in multitystem failure, those in a persistent vegetative
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State or neonates with no hope o f survival, that treatment should not be provided and
palliative care should be instituted instead.
There are two types o f physiological futility. First, is the qualitative type o f
futility that concerns the quality o f life o f the patient. It is a treatment that renders a
patient permanently unconscious or that patient must rely on intensive care for the
rest o f his life, that treatment may be considered futile. In other words, that
unconscious patient will never wake up and the patient in intensive care cannot
survive outside the intensive care environment. Examples o f qualitative futility
would be those who are in a persistent vegetative state with no quality o f life. The
other type of physiological futility is classified as quantitative. If a treatment
continually fails in the last one hundred cases, then it could be considered futile (5).
An example o f this type o f fiitility could encompass the use o f CPR in the terminally
ill and the elderly in multi-system failure. I argue that these definitions, and the
guidelines o f the Hastings Center for applying these definitions should be followed
since the issue here is that o f providing futile treatment to those who have no hope of
recovery.
Objections:
I.

Truog, Frader, and Brett in their article “The Problem with Futility” state that
“the rapid advance o f the language o f futility into the jargon o f bioethics
should be followed by an equally rapid retreaf*(6). The authors believe that
there are hidden agendas in the word ‘futility’, for example, conflicts
regarding value judgments, rationing, and statistical probability.
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In regards to the value judgments, the authors state that the physician’s values
and the family’s values are not the same. In other words, in the case o f futile care, we
should probably resuscitate a person even though it might only be for a short time and
the patient never regains consciousness.
In response, I would argue that the value judgment o f the physicians and the
families may differ, but most likely, the physicians realize that the patient will not
regain consciousness, not even for a short time. I f the physician knows this, then he
should not provide futile care.
In reviewing the rationing question, the authors seem to think that using the
term medical futility might cover up a form o f rationing. However, as far as futility
and rationing are concerned, medical futility is not used as a “cover-up” for resource
allocation or rationing. Advanced medical technology is provided to most o f the
population, that is the reason why resources are becoming scarce in the year 2000.
2.

Truog et al., regard futility as a matter o f probability, that one can never say
never, that a treatment would not woric for a patient However, I believe
making that a blanket statement regarding futile treatment would not be a
realistic point of view. Most patients who are terminally ill, in a persistent
vegetative state, or the elderly in multisystem failure do not recover when they
are provided with advanced medical technology, which in my point o f view, I
regard as futile care.
The medical profession is keepmg people alive for an inordinate amount o f

time due to the advanced medical technolo^ that is used today. Some m the medical
profession believe that we (as medical professionals) have a moral responsibility to
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keep patients alive at all costs. Yet if the patient has no quality o f life, does not
recognize anyone, or is unaware o f his/her surroundings, we are certainly not acting
in the patients’ best interest to keep them “alive at all costs.” Most o f these patients
have no quality o f life, but just lay in the bed being (if you will) turned, watered, and
fed. How can one justify the dignity o f a person who was once a whole human being,
possessed an intelligent mind and had feelings? I find that the degradation o f that
person is deplorable. All one has to do is take a tour through an intensive care unit or
a long term care facility to witness this degradation o f the human body.
Rationing, to save time and expense, has not been a factor in withholding care
or treatment in the United States as it has in some European countries, namely,
England and Holland. And if one looks at statistical probability in futility judgments,
many o f the cases where futile care has been provided have resulted in negative
outcomes. Therefore, I believe the term ‘medical futility’ should be retained in the
bioethics language.
3.

Ethical Issues in Futilitv:
There are several issues governing the ethics o f futility: a) trust combined

with communication, b)economics and rationing, c) justice, beneficence, non
malfeasance, and autonomy.
Advanced medical technology that is used today has proved to be life saving
many times, but it has also failed in a large number o f cases. Family members or
significant others often request physicians to perform a ‘miracle’ for their loved one,
many o f whom have no hope fer survival. These same technologies have also created
ethical dilemmas that were unknown to medicme before this time (such as the use o f
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intubation and kidney dialysis). Even though the best medical procedures are being
used and are not effective to the patient, families or others may request these
procedures in the hope a ‘miracle’ will occur. These requests are often made due to a
lack o f trust in the physicians who are caring for the patient in the hospital.
4.

Trust combined with Communication:
Gone are the days when families had just one physician to deal with their

medical problems. These family physicians not only knew the patient’s medical
problems, but they knew the family dynamics as well. Many in the population o f the
United States can still remember the family physician and how he was thoroughly
trusted. This element o f trust was lost when physicians started to specialize and most
o f these specialists were strangers to the family. Not only were they strangers, but
many did not seem to take an interest in getting to know the families or the problems
they were facing while a family member was in the hospital. Many physicians, due to
their caseload, still do not take the time to effectively communicate with the patient or
their families, and a trusting relationship cannot be built with a physician who spends
a short period o f time with them. When questions are presented to the physician,
ho'she should take the time to answer these questions totally and honestly even if the
answers are those that one does not wish to hear. Trust in the physician is such an
important issue involvmg patients today, in part because there is such a large amount
o f medical information published m books, magazines, and on the mtemet today. The
American population is no longer m awe o f the medical profession as it was m the
past; trust therefore needs to be earned and given, not taken for granted.
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Another problem with the specialization of medicine was and contmues to be
that each body system has its own specialist and often times these physicians are not
in total agreement with one another regarding the prognosis o f the patient There can
be as many as six or seven physicians caring for one patient and the family/surrogate
may hear a different prognosis from each one.
Under these conditions, families are ofren at a loss to make decisions
regarding futile care because physicians do not communicate, not only with the
families, but also with one another. The bioethical principle o f veracity may be an
issue in these situations. It is imperative for the physicians to provide one whole truth
to families/surrogates in the cases that involve futile care.
As physicians make their hospital rounds, they write on the progress notes, but
they do not have or take the time to read another physicians’ notes (which may differ
slightly from their own note). It takes only one physician to offer hope, when there is
no chance o f recovery, to cause confusion when the other physicians on the case feel
that the case is futile. The intricacies and the prognosis o f the patients’ condition
should be expressed truthfully as a whole, so a decision can be made.
Communication and trust in the physicians combined with discussion is the key in
these cases.
Judith Darr in her article “Medical Futility and the Implications for Physician
Autonomy” states that communication is an ectremely important part o f the treatment
plan and would obviously alleviate many conflicts concemmg the care o f patients,
particularly those that are considered futile (7).
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If this communicatioii is lacking, then obviously it is up to one person (this is
usually the nurse caring for the patient) to bring these physicians together and request
a care conference so the family and the surrogate can reach a reasonable and morally
acceptable decision for the family member who is dying. If some physicians are stül
in disagreement after a care conference has been held, then it is time for the hospital
ethics committee to be involved. The committee will call family, physicians and staff
together to facilitate discussion and enable them to reach a decision. Many cases that
have been brought before the hospitals’ ethics committee have helped the families
reach a comfortable decision. It is very rare that these meetings fail in the goal o f
facilitation.
(b) Economics and Rationing:
Economics will become an issue in futile care very quickly, especially with
managed care involved on the scene. Robert Veatch states in his article “Justice and
the Economics o f Terminal Illness” that twenty to thirty percent o f all health care
costs are devoted to the terminally ill. He defines terminally ill as “an illness in
which, on the basis o f the best diagnostic criteria and in the light o f available
therapies a reasonable estimation can be made prospectically and with a high
probability that a person will die within a relatively short period o f time.” He also
states that providmg heroic care in the termmally ill is “only marginally beneficial” or
“useless” at most (8).
There are two issues that 1 would like to discuss regardmg terminal care and
the economics o f providmg this care. One involves the care o f the elderly who have
multisystem failure. This person has diabetes combined with end-stage renal failure
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and end-stage cardiomyopathy. Long term dialysis, possible heart surgery and
possible long term use o f a ventilator would be required to keep this patient alive but
this treatment would not provide a cure. The cost of this type o f care for a patient
with this type o f terminal illness would be prohibitive. Palliative care should be
instituted in this case since it is a great possibility that the most advanced care would
prove to be futile.
The other end of the terminally ill spectrum concerns infant futile care.
Consider the case of an infant bom with the chromosome disorder Trisomy 13. These
infants suffer from profound retardation, seizures, apneic episodes (the infant stops
breathing), feeding disorders, severe failure to thrive, visual and hearing defects and
other brain disorders. Twenty percent o f theses infants are stillborn, fifty percent die
by six months o f age, and eighty five percent die by the end o f the first year o f life
(9). These infants should be treated until the parents are mformed o f the prognosis,
then decisions should be made (either palliative care or hospice) according to the
infants’ condition. Placmg these infants into a Neonatal hitensive Care Unit would
again be prohibitively expensive since the high tech treatment would not cure the
underlying problem.
GUIDe (Guidelines for hitensive Care in Colorado) a group in Denver,
Colorado, recently formulated guidelines regarding fiitile care in the neonatal
intensive care unit These guidelines state that babies who weigh five hundred grams
and under or those who are less than twenty-four weeks should not be resuscitated.
Other conditions included Trisomy 13 and 18 (m which death w ill occur without
ventilator support), anencephaly, and other conifitions o f shnilar magnitude (10).
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These guidelines should be conununicated to the parents and decisions made
concurrently with the physicians. Again, communication and discussion is the key in
many instances.
(c ) Justice. Beneficence. Non-malfeasance and Autonomy:
In addition to communication and trust, discussed in Section (a), the four
additional ethical principles that govern medicine are those o f justice, beneficence,
non-malfeasance and autonomy.
Rosemarie Tong in her article ‘Toward a Just, Courageous, and Honest
Resolution o f the Futility Debate” states that the above principles come into play in
the area o f withholding or withdrawing futile treatment in hospitals (11).
The concept o f justice means that fair and equitable treatment should be given
to everyone. Distributive justice is the type o f justice that is relevant to medical
futility; and with justice, economics goes hand in hand in the field o f health care. If
one uses the definition o f justice as fairness, then everyone should be treated equally.
Therefore, a patient in a persistent vegetative state or one who is terminally ill would
be given the same medical treatment as a patient who is acutely ill and not in the
former state. However, due to the advanced medical technology, one really cannot
justify treating all patients equally. It would not be economically feasible. We
should then consider utilitarian justice as an alternative. Here the whole o f society
should be considered, not just the needs o f a few or o f an individual who would be
receiving futile care, hi other words, we should not perform heart surgery on a
patient who would not benefit finm that procedure which might only be prolonging
his death and causmg untold suffering. We could use the funds for those who would
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benefit firom the treatment, hence the principle o f utilitarian justice, maximizing
utility for the whole o f society.
Another form o f justice in the health care field is that o f intergenerational
justice(I2). Resources are becoming scarce in the United States, therefore, the cost o f
care in becoming a problem. How can we equate the cost for care o f a severely
prematurely infant in the neonatal intensive care unit with a minimal chance of
survival with the preventative care and rehabilitation o f our elderly population (13)?
Also to be considered is the allocation of fimds to the elderly in total body failure,
that would likely involve fiitile care, as opposed to the health care for children, young
adults, and those in mid-lifo who are acutely ill and would benefit firom the care given
in an intensive care unit.
As care is given to these patients, the ethical principle o f beneficence, acting
in the patients’ best interests or acting as the patients’ advocate should be uppermost
in the mind o f the health care team. Beneficence is defined as the value o f doing
good. In medicine, it would mean improving the quality o f the patients’ life. It could
mean that the burdens o f the treatment do not outweigh the benefits to the patient.
One o f the goals o f medicine is to improve the quality o f the patients’ life.
Advanced medical technology used many times when futile care is provided to a
patient, inflicts pain or some severe form o f discomfort. We are definitely not
practicing this principle o f beneficence or acting m the best interest o f the patient
when we provide this kmd o f care.
Sharing the prmciple ofbeneficence is that o f non-malfeasance. Non
malfeasance is defined as ‘doing no harm’ and to provide competent care to the
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patient. We must act in the best interest o f the patient. Yet, if “do no harm” credo is
used, can the withholding or withdrawing of treatment be said to be doing harm to the
patient? Tom Beachamp states, in his book. Principles o f Biomedical Ethics that the
principle o f non-malfeasance support more specific rules (14). One of these rules is
“do not cause pain and suffering to others.” If we withhold treatments that will cause
pain or suffering to a terminally ill patient, we are upholding the principle o f non
malfeasance.
Another one o f these rules is “do not kill”. Would the medical profession be
guilty o f killing a patient if life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn fipm a terminally
ill patient who is dying? The answer is no, because the patient is already in a terminal
state and we are allowing him/her to die. We have just been prolonging a life with
the use o f advanced medical technology.
What is the difference between killing and letting die? How can we
distinguish between them? Killing is the deliberate act o f taking a life, while letting
die permits a patient to die without the interference of advanced medical technology.
An example o f this concept is the case o f Samuel Linares (15). Samuel was a toddler
o f fifteen months when he ingested a balloon and the obstruction o f his airway caused
the child to stop breathing. He was rushed to a hospital emergency room in Chicago.
He was resuscitated and left in a persistent vegetative state that was due to a lack o f
oxygen to his brain. After admission to the hospital, the father begged the physicians
to remove life support finm his son and the physicians refused. The father finally
held the hospital staff at bay with a gun; removed life support from his son and held
the child until he died. The District Attomty stated that the father killed his son, but
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the father stated that the balloon his son ingested killed him. The coroner ruled the
death as accidental. The father did not wish his son to live in this persistent
vegetative state. This example o f letting die portrays a child in extremis when
brought into the hospital emergency room.
As one moves from the principle o f non-malfeasance to autonomy, we must
take the wishes o f the patient or the surrogate into consideration. Autonomy has
acquired meanings as diverse as self-governance (16). According to this principle,
the patient has the right to refuse treatment, yet, many physicians refuse to honor
these requests. These physicians are afraid o f the legal ramifications if they do honor
these wishes. Some physicians feel that the patient is making the wrong decision if
they refuse treatment. One factor should be remembered; physicians are taught to
cure and do everything in their armamentarium to bring about that cure and some
physicians think they are performing physician-assisted suicide if they let the patient
have the right to die.
When one makes a choice regarding medical care,”[a]utonomy is your right to
determine what is done to you, to make decisions for yourself...Your right to
personal liberty, privacy, and confidentiality, to be left alone and to be respected as a
person, all flow from this principle, and your physician has an obligation to promote
and respect your rights, values, preferences and choices” (17).
Can the physician be held liable when he allows a patient to die if he does
honor that patient’s wishes? Judicial precedent states no:
There can no longer be any question friat our society and our law reject
technological vitalism in treating the termmally 31, and that the contract
model has triumphed at the points where it overh^s with criminal law
norms. We do not violate the sanctity oflifo when w e Ihnit
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technology’s use to settings where it can provide benefit, understood
by such, by those we claim to help (18).
I would like to present a case where these principles of ethics could have and
should have been applied.
Consider the case o f a male infant bom in 1976 weighing eight hundred
grams. The mother was only five and one half months pregnant and delivered early
due to a placenta previa (a low-lying placenta). The infant sturvived for several days
without any extraordinary means, then developed problems and was transferred to
another facility many miles firom his home.
The infant then developed respiratory problems and was placed on a
ventilator. The parents objected and the physicians stated they would obtain a court
order if the parents refused the ventilator. Complication upon complication
developed and the parents felt they had no choice or voice in the decision-making
process for their child. Not only did they feel they had no voice in the decision
making process, they also felt their mfant would not survive. The parents felt their
baby was an experiment and not their child. Trust was an issue and communication
was a problem.
The parents wrote o f their experiences in a book. The Lone Dvine o f Babv
Andrew (19). They hoped the book would provide some knowledge to other parents
and would give decision-making back to the parents.
While the parents presented their side, the physicians presented them case m
another vein. T h^r stated that many o f the concerns o f the parents were with
themselves and them foiancial situation. Thty (the parents) had fow concerns for the
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infant. The physicians failed to see the burdens o f the parents traveling a great
distance to see the infant or to realize the financial burdens placed upon them (20).
While reviewing this case, one can observe that the principles o f autonomy,
non-malfeasance, and justice were lacking. Physician paternalism seemed to be
paramount in this case. The physicians would not discuss the case or the prognosis
with the parents. This infant was not brain dead so the ethical principle o f non
malfeasance was ignored, the treatments causing pain and suffering to the infant. The
only way these infants can communicate is with a high pitched cry, so we do not
know the degree o f pain we are causing.
The parents knew instinctively that them child would not survive, yet, they
were not consulted during the course o f his treatment, nor did they have a voice in the
treatment o f their son. Autonomy was the issue here, this principle was not upheld.
If the physicians felt that the infant would not survive, why did they spend a
large amoimt o f dollars to keep the infant alive? How could they justify this
treatment? The benefits o f the treatment in this case certainly did not outweigh the
burdens to the infant or to his family. The principle o f justice was not upheld.
If these principles had been followed, trust in the physicians had been present,
and communication had been open, this infant may not have suffered and instead died
apeacefiildeath.
5.

Applications o f Ethical Decision Making:
Decisions concerning medical futility are quite often difficult and involve

ethical dilemmas. Many o f these dilemmas involve withholdmg and withdrawing
treatment firom a patient. And, whenever ethical issues are present in a case, there can
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also be conflict. This conflict may exist among nurses, physicians, and
families/surrogates. Refusal to treat due to a diagnosis and/or prognosis or the
withdrawal o f life support can cause the death o f a patient. Some professionals and
many families are reluctant to make a decision because death is so final. They may
realize that the decision they make is really in the best interest o f the patient, but they
also feel guilty if they are part o f a decision to take a life.
One way to resolve this conflict is to have open communication among the
professionals and the families/surrogates mvolved with the patient. A conference
should be held to determine the diagnosis, condition and prognosis o f the patient. Is
the treatment being provided to the patient a benefit or is it just band-aiding one
problem before another part of the body fails? This band-aiding process is usually the
course o f action when fiitile care is bemg provided. One major system is the root
cause o f the patient’s pending demise and since this system cannot be cured, the rest
o f the systems are failing one by one.
The wishes o f the patient should be considered. If the patient does not wish to
prolong her life due to her illness, that wish should be honored. The ethical issue
occurs when the patient is no longer competent and has no advance directive. She has
not stated her wished to anyone in the family. What will her quality o f life be if the
treatment is continued? The possibility is good that she will be admitted to a long
term care facility and her quality o f life will be profotmdly diminished. The benefit
o f the treatment would not outweigh the burden to the patient or to her family.
If this patient suffers finm end-stage cardiomyopathy, it means no type o f
treatment can cure the heart and the patient will die. If the heart stops, we could
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resuscitate the patient with various cardiac drugs until the respiratory and renal
systems fail. Then a ventilator could be used in combination with the drugs and the
patient could be dialyzed to keep the kidneys functioning. The fact remains; the heart
cannot be cured, so we are providing futile care to the patient. The healthcare team
should be negotiating with the family to provide palliative care to this patient so she
can end her life with dignity.
Another type o f ethical issue can occur when a patient is alert and can make
decisions. This patient has a diagnosis that will eventually cause her demise, but she
could live for a prolonged period o f time if she receives extraordinary treatment.
Consider the patient with a diagnosis o f amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a
degeneration o f the upper and lower nerves leading from the brain to the spinal cord
and from the spinal cord to the muscles o f the body. Prognosis o f the disease is very
poor. Life expectancy from this disease is approximately three years. The mind is
alert but the body has failed. Here is a patient who had a vibrant personality and led
an active life, now she is chained to a bed and must have all her needs met. She can
no longer swallow, so she has a tube placed in her stomach for nourishment, and the
only way she can answer questions is by signal-blinking her eyes.
The patient develops a severe pnetunonia and requires hospitalization but
refuses treatment with antibiotics. She communicates that the burdens o f living do
not outweigh the benefits o f the treatment to be provided. This patient does not wish
to live in this dependent state any longer even though she has a loving family who
would care for her.
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The nurses, physicians, family members and other members o f the healthcare
team understand her decision but are having difficulty abiding with that decision. So,
we go back to the diagnosis, condition and prognosis o f the patient. The diagnosis o f
ALS will eventually take her life, her condition at this time is poor but she could
recover. The overall prognosis o f her disease is extremely poor. We would be
honoring her autonomy if we honored her wishes; she no longer wishes to live in this
debilitated state and considers her life to be a burden to herself and to her family. The
principle ofbeneficence is honored because we would not be providing her with
treatment that could be painful to her. Again, we should hold a care conference and
reiterate the diagnosis, condition o f the patient, prognosis o f the patient and the
quality o f life o f this patient. This care conference may enable everyone concerned
with the case to understand the feelings of the patient so they can feel comfortable
with her decision. We can provide palliative care and support the patient by
upholding her decision.
6.

Conclusion:
So, in conclusion, I have supported the physiological definition o f futility and

determined that medically futile care should not be provided to the elderly with
multisystem failure, severely premature infants, infants with severe anomalies, those
patients who are in a persistent vegetative state and those who are in a terminal state.
I have stressed the importance o f communication and trust between family members
and physicians.
The ethical principles o f justice, beneficence, autonomy and non-malfeasance
have been discussed and how they can be used to œ able the medical profession to
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come to decisions regarding futile care. Finally, conflict resolution and the decisionmaking process have been discussed using these principles.
Many o f these ethical issues could possibly be resolved if the patient had a
living will or a durable poser o f attorney for health care as is posited in the Patient
Self-Determination Act, the subject o f the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
PATIENT RIGHTS AND THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT
Patient rights and the Patient Self-Determination Act have had an impact on
patient autonomy but not one the proponents o f this Act would like. This Act is
known as the Danforth Amendment and stresses patient autonomy, specifically the
right to refuse treatment. But the public has been very wary o f the use o f advance
directives, which are supposed to give them the right to have a choice in determining
their medical care. This chapter will explain how patient rights and advance directive
came into being and how if these directives were used properly, many cases involving
medical futility would be avoided.
These directives consist o f a living will or a durable power o f attorney for
healthcare. Yet, even when patients have advance directives, many physicians or
family members have not honored these directives, hi some cases, the lack o f the
advance directive has saved the patient’s life. Consider the case o f a patient with an
acute exacerbation o f chronic obstructive pulmonary disease that might require the
temporary use o f a ventilator. If the patient had a living will that stated they did not
wish any type o f life support to be administered in any case, that patient might be
allowed to die without any treatment.
A short history o f the Patient Bill o f Rights and the Patient SelTDeteimmation
Act w ill provide msight to the reasons why these laws are Emportant and why th ^ r are
not widely hnplemented in the healthcare field today.

41
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The Patient Bill o f rights was the result o f a study done by the National
Welfare Rights Organization in 1970(1). This organization investigated hospitals and
the way patients were treated, especially m the admission process and the right to
privacy (2). The report published in that year contained a list o f twenty six items
concerning patients which was then presented to the Joint Commission on
Accreditation for Hospitals. The Jomt Commission adopted a number o f these items
regarding patient rights and then published these rights in their manual. At that time,
the Joint Commission manual was a document o f a more or less philosophical nature
and the hospitals were not forced to comply with the contents. Some o f these rights
included access o f care to all persons regardless o f race, color, creed, national origin,
or ability to pay. One of the most important rights stated that the patient had the right
to be told the truth about their medical condition and to give informed consent for
their treatment. Informed consent is that type o f consent whereby a physician must
inform the patient o f the benefits or the side effects o f any treatment provided, hi the
I970’s and until this decade, paternalism was the dominant way physicians practiced
medicine and patients were not told o f the seriousness o f their condition, nor were
they allowed to have a decision in the care they were to receive. While the list of
rights in the 1970’s was long and the Jomt Commission expected compliance, it is
now mandated that the hospitals have a specific list o f rights and thty^ (the hospitals)
must comply. The list o f eleven rights, which mcludes the right to refuse treatment,
must be enforced in the year, 2000. I f compliance does not occur by the hospital, it
may forfeit Medicare fhndmg.
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Senator Edward Kennedy headed a Commission named “Quality o f Health
Care and Human Experimentation” in 1973. While Senator Kennedy’s Committee
began by investigating research, it later turned to the field o f medical ethics. The
issues in this field now became public knowledge. The Commission then became the
President’s Commission for the study o f Ethical Problems in Medicine (3).
So despite physician opposition, a Commission was formed by the United
States Congress in 1978, to examine and scrutinize the field o f medical ethics. It was
the use o f advanced medical technology and the quality o f life o f the patients that was
at the root o f the movement (4).
Patient rights were becoming an issue in the 1970’s when Ralph Nader’s
group, “The Public Citizens Health Research Group” continued to spotlight patients’
rights as public policy (5). The Quinlan and Cruzan cases brought forward the way
these rights were contested in the healthcare field and are cited as landmark cases in
the field o f bioethics in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
The right to refuse treatment became a public issue in 1975 when Karen Ann
Quinlan, a seventeen year old, collapsed at a parQr, possibly firom a combination o f
drugs and alcohol, and was taken to a hospital where she lapsed mto a coma. She
suffered &om a lack o f o^qrgen to the brain and gradually regressed into a persistent
vegetative state firom which she would never recover. The term “persistent vegetative
state” was coined m the The Lancet, a British Medical Journal, m 1972. The patient
is awake but unaware o f himself or anything around him. The patient has periods o f
sleep and wakefulness, moves, but not voluntarily, and echibits no emotions. This
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State is more common due to the advanced technology that was used and is being
used today.
After Quinlan existed a few months in this state, her parents requested that the
respirator be removed from their daughter. The physician agreed, but then decided it
would be morally wrong for him to perfonn this act. The hospital concurred, stating
that Quinlan did not meet the Harvard brain-death criteria and thus she was still alive.
We must remember that during this time, advanced medical technology was
now being used with greater frequency; especially in the field (e.g. by emergency
medical personnel). For example, it was used as a result of car accidents, or in the
case o f Quinlan, being admitted to the emergency department due to an unknown
cause. When Quinlan was admitted to the emergency department, the physicians
were not quite sure o f her specific diagnosis.
In addition to the advanced care in the field and in the emergency department,
critical care units were now an integral part o f the hospital. While nurses and
physicians were already making life and death decisions, withdrawing life support
from a patient, especially one so young, was not a commonality. There were also
legal aspects to consider: would the physicians or nurses lose thefr license because
they caused a patient to die? These were the questions that remained to be answered
in this case, so those involved m the case were very uncomfortable with making the
decision to withdraw the ventilator. Not only were there legalities to consider, but
also many o f the staff did not think it was ethical or moral to withdraw life support
even though there was no quality o f life for Quinlan.
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The Quinlans took their case to Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled in their favor (6). The respirator was removed, but not the feeding tube.
Quinlan lived for eight more years in this persistent vegetative state until her death in
June, 1985.
While cases such as Quinlan had existed in hospitals for years, none had
received much publicity. Right-to-die issues became quite prominent surrounding
this case. In 1976, before the Quinlan case, five states had legislation introduced
regarding the right to die issue, but it was defeated in all five states (7).
After the Quinlan case, in 1976, seven states (Nevada, California, Arkansas,
Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon, and Texas) signed bills into law regarding right-to-die
issues (8). “Quinlan stands out as the first right-to-die case heard by a state Superior
Court in which the Court fi-eely injected itself into the sacrosanct doctor-patient
relationship as an arbiter o f rights and wrongs. In other words, the Quinlan case
personalized issues such as this and brought to the forefront that medical issues such
as the right-to-die issue should be considered family affairs, not decided by the state
in the Court system. The Court argued in ground breaking fashion, that the Quinlan
case raised questions that transcended the medical hegemony that had traditionally
existed”(9). In other words, physician paternalism and one-sided decision making
was finally becoming an issue in the care o f patients.
The Cruzan case is the second landmark case in the quest for patient rights. In
1983, at age 25, Cruzan was involved in a car accident where her brain was deprived
o f oxygen for 20 mmutes or longer. She was resuscitated but was left m a persistent
vegetative state due to irreversible brain damage. Cruzan’s body eventually assumed
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a fetal position and she was kept alive by feeding her through a gastrostomy tube (a
tube surgically inserted into her stomach). After five years in this state, in 1988, the
family requested that the feeding tube be removed. Judge Charles E Teel, who
presided over the Probate Division Court in Jaspar, Missouri, agreed with the
Cruzans, but there was a debate in Court whether this act would honor Nancy
Cruzan’s request (she had previously stated that she would not wish to live if she had
no quality o f life) under informed consent or if it would be criminal homicide (10).
Appeals were immediately filed by the state and the case was moved to the Missouri
Supreme Court. The Court refused the Cruzans’ request. They (the Court) agreed
that Nancy Cruzan’s wishes were not known. According to the state law in Missouri,
clear and convincing evidence that the patient did not wish to live in a persistent
vegetative state must be present to terminate life-sustaining treatment
The Cruzans again appealed and the case was taken to the United States
Supreme C ourt which recognized a right-to-die but also stated that the states have a
right to set “reasonable standards” to guide the exercise of that right (11). The state
o f Missouri again demanded clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes
before the Cruzans’ request to remove the feeding tube would be honored. In the
Cruzan case, two fiiends came forward and stated that Cruzan did not wish to live if
she must depend on artificial means to sustain her.
The Cruzan case is cited as the most important bioethical case decided by the
United States Supreme Court (12). In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court’s ruling
established a constitutional right to refiise treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee to liberty. The Fourteenth Amendment is a guarantee o f
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freedom o f choice and action. Before the case, the right to refuse could be changed
by statute or case law. The Supreme Court decided that a prior judgment o f a
competent person could be taken into consideration (13).
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. Concurring Justices
Scalia and O’Connor presented other opinions in this case and Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmum, and Stevens presented the dissenting opinions.
The opinion o f Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated that liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment must protect, if it protects anything, an individual’s
deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment including the artificial delivery
o f food and water (14). The state must honor the decision regarding the medical
treatment of a surrogate appointed by the patient. In my opinion. Justice O’Cormor is
establishing a right for anyone to refuse care if they so desire.
On the other hand, concurring Justice Scalia presented this opinion stated
thus:
A state has the power to ignore an individual’s refusal o f treatment, even
if proven by clear and convincing evidence, because of its interest in
preventing suicide (15).

Justice Scalia also believes that the state has the power to prohibit by force if
necessary that right o f patients to refuse treatment even if they are in a terminal state
o f dying. Scalia does not differentiate between removal o f life support and ordmary
suicide. Justice Scalia also believes that the state has the power to prohibit by “force
if necessary” that right to refuse treatment even if the patient is in an hmnment state
o f dying, those with no hope o f cure, and those who are racked with pain due to a
terminal condition (16).
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Suicide is defined in the Encyclopedia and Dictionary o f Medicine and
Nursing as the act o f taking one’s life. While Justice Scalia seems to have the
patient’s interest in mind, he is taking away the right for a patient to refiise no mattar
what the case. With all due respect to the Justice, I will argue against Scalia’s
opinion o f equating suicide and the removal of life support. Suicide is the deliberate
act o f taking one’s life, while a person who is in a persistent vegetative state such as
Cruzan cannot actively take her own life because she has no thought processes to
make that decision. Nor do most o f the patients who have life support removed.
If we go back to the 1960’s, there were few means to sustain a person’s life
and the person was allowed to die a dignified death. I firmly believe that this should
be the case today: let the patient die a dignified death without being prodded with
tubes, needles, and other treatments to sustain a life when there is no hope.
The dissenting Justices were sensitive to the “individual rights o f patients and
the realities o f medical practice”. Justice Brennan observed “that the Missouri rule is
one that transform human beings into passive subjects to medical technology”.
Justice Brennan’s words in his closing statement are as follows:
Missouri and this Court have displaced Nancy’s own assessment o f the
processes o f dying. They have (fiscarded evidence o f her own will, ignored
her values, and deprived her o f the right to a decision as closely
approximatmg her own choice as humanly possible. They have done this
disingenuously in her name, and openly in Missouri’s own. That Missouri
and this Court may be truly motivated only be concerns for mcompetent
patients is no matter. As one o f our most prominent jurists warned us decades
ago: ’Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty,
when the government purposes are beneficent...The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men o f zeal, well meaning, but
without understanding (17).
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Since the Cruzans’ request failed to satisfy the state’s evidentiary standards,
the United States Supreme Court sent the case back to Missouri and the case was
presented again to the Probate Division courtroom o f Judge Teel. The Judge heard
testimony o f friends who had conversations with the patient in the matter o f
sustaining life in a terminal condition or in a persistent vegetative state. The
physician, who at first refused to remove the feeding tube, finally changed his mind.
Even the Court appointed guardian sided with the Cruzans stating “to be kept alive in
a persistent vegetative state would be living hell”(18). On December 14, 1990, the
feeding tube was removed fix>m Nancy Cruzan and she died within eleven days. As
an aside to this case, Nancy Cruzan’s father committed suicide in 1997. He was
never able to completely resolve the emotional problems that occurred during the
years his daughter lived in a persistent vegetative state.
As a result o f this case. Senator John Danforth o f Missouri introduced and
pushed through Congress the Patient Self-Determination A ct, which now plays a
prominent role in patients’ rights and the right to refuse treatment.
The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) was part o f a 1990 amendment to
the Medicare law. As mentioned previously, it was written by Senator John Danforth
o f Missouri and is named the Danforth Amendment. It stresses patient autonomy and
specifically the right to refuse treatment. In order to receive Medicare funds, the law
states that a hospital must ask if the patient has an advance directive and record that
answer on the patient’s chart If the patient does not have an advance dhrective, the
hospital must provide information to the patient on how thqr can obtam that directive.
In the event the patient does have an advance directive, a copy must be obtamed and
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placed on the chart. If a copy is unavailable, the substance of the directive must be
obtained and recorded in the chart. The substances o f a directive are the wishes o f the
patient should he/she become incapacitated and unable to make decisions regarding
their care. The law also requires hospitals to have policies regarding these directives
and a mechanism to educate the staff and the community concerning these directives.
The intent o f the Danforth Amendment is as follows:
More and more it is arguable that we play God by subjecting people to
unwanted and sometimes unnecessary treatment, treatment that unnaturally
prolongs the dying process. Our health care system has become, with
extending life, at times neglecting the caring component o f medicine and
trampling on the rights o f patients (19).

The passage o f this act was passed as an important milestone for patient
rights, enabling them to specify treatments they will refuse or those they will accept
should they become incapacitated and unable to make decisions.
The two most common forms o f advance directives are living wills, also
called a declaration, and a durable power o f attorney for health care. A living will is
a document whereby an individual can specify those treatments he would refuse if he
were to become incapacitated and unable to make a decision. A durable power o f
attorney for health care authorizes a spouse, significant other, a relative other than a
spouse, or another person to make decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment if
the patient becomes incapacitated. This document may or may not be notarized. It is
extremely important to instruct the patient that there is a difference between a power
o f attorney and a durable power o f attomQr for health care. Many do not realize the
difference between the two documents. A regular power o f atto rn ^ is a document
that concerns money and property while a durable power of atto m ^ for healthcare is
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a document that concerns health care only. Even though the Danforth Amendment
was passed, the impact o f this bill has not been what the proponents expected or
hoped would happen with its passage. When the bill was passed, approximately 4%
of Americans had what constituted a living will or an advance directive. Even though
the community and the staff of hospitals have been educated, the numbers of
Americans who have advance directive remains low, at eight to fifteen percent (20).
At this writing, the District o f Columbia and forty-six states authorize both the
living will and the durable power o f attorney for healthcare. One state, Alaska,
authorizes only the living will and three states, Massachusetts, New York, and
Michigan authorize only the durable power o f attorney for health care (21).
Also as a result o f the publicity that highlighted the Quinlan and Cruzan cases,
the Joint Commission mandated that hospitals educate the public, on admission to the
hospital, that they have a right to refuse treatment. The hospital must also inform the
patient that they have a right to have an advance directive or to have a surrogate
decision maker.
What seems to be the reason that advance directives are not a success in the
United States, or for that matter in any other country in the civilized world? When I
lecture to the community m Las Vegas on the subject o f advance directives, the
consensus of the listeners seems to be that they are afiraid if something does happen to
them, say an acute illness, an advance directive may be the cause o f their death. In
other words, if they had an advance dhective, the staff o f the hospital would not
resuscitate them. Others foar that even if they had an advance dhrective and they were
mcapacitated, the physician or the family would not honor the dkective and they as a
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patient would suffer for a long period of time. Numerous members o f the population
have observed relatives or friends go through this process.
Karen O. Kaplan, who is executive director o f Choice in Dying, is proposing
legislation to encourage physicians to speak o f advance directives as part of patient
care instead o f approaching this subject only in a medical crises. Karen Kaplan also
states that the threat of lawsuits may force hospitals to pay more attention to the
wishes o f patients, their relations or surrogates. As a case in point, a family
successfully won a lawsuit against a hospital for refusing to follow a mother’s
directive that her daughter not be resuscitated. After the resuscitation, the daughter
was left in a persistent vegetative state and this cost the hospital $16,000,000. So even
though the patient had advance directives placed on the chart, the physician and the
hospital refused to honor the directive (22).
Care that is provided to a patient contrary to their written wishes can be
construed as battery. At this writing, the Courts are becoming more willing to
consider battery to the patients if advance directives or a durable power o f attorney
for health care are not honored.
On the other hand, Arthur Caplan, director for the Center o f Bioethics at the
University o f Pennsylvania, predicted “that the act would be a failure”, and the
SUPPORT study (Study to Understand Prognosis and Preferences for Outcomes and
Risks o f Treatment) seems to support his thinking. It found many shortcomings in
the treatment o f the terminally ill. Many physicians were unaware that their patients
had signed advance directives, so many o f these patients had painfol deaths when
their wishes were not honored in the KZU. In many cases, even if the directive was
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placed in front o f the chart, the physician did not honor it. Even though nurses ware
appointed to intervene in the cases where the patients had an advance directive, it did
not make a difference, since the physicians did not honor those directives. Some
ethicists feel that since the SUPPORT study shows advance directives are failing, that
physician-assisted suicide will become more common. Joseph J. Fins, a physician
and director o f medical ethics at a New York hospital, states that he sees suicide as a
symptom o f the problem and not a solution. He also states that physicians should
focus on palliative treatment instead o f trying to cure an incurable disease.
Daniel Callahan states “that these problems can be resolved only by bringing
about profound changes in the way the medical profession and the society at large
think about dying, we thought at first all we needed was reform, it is now obvious that
we need a revolution” (23).
Another perspective on advance dfrectives is that of Christopher James Ryan,
a psychiatrist in New South Wales, Australia. He states that he feels there are
problems with advance directives. Ryan feels that there are unnecessary deaths due
to the use o f the directives; if a patient is temporarily mcapacitated, he should be
resuscitated until he can wake up to make another decision (24).
Ryan begins his article with a mythical story. A king mtroduces a new law
and “this law allowed his subjects to enter into a mysterious wager”. The participants
had to answer a certain question given beforehand and the entrance to this contest was
strictly voluntary. If the contestant won, he was rewarded, however, if he lost he was
put to death. Many lost their lives needlessly due to the partic^ation m this contest.
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He equates participation m the contest with signing an advance directive.
Ryan states that those who sign advance directives when they are well may not be
making the right choice for end o f life decisions. In other words, you may think you
know the right answer to the question, but you do not. The other analogy he makes is
to imagine yourself in a state o f terminal illness, a temporary confused state, or
unconscious but having a chance for survival—will you be treated aggressively or
will you just receive palliative care?
He does clarify one point, that he does not oppose all forms o f advance
directives. He only opposed those cases where the directive states that only palliative
care will be given to one in an incompetent state that is potentially reversible, because
unnecessary deaths may be the result.
While autonomy is the goal o f the advance directive, the author objects to the
fact that the choices are different between a real situation and when an imaginary
scenario is presented to one who must make a lifo or death decision.
Ryan stresses that the “utilitarian argument draws its strength from the hope
that the existence of advance directives will end the suffering o f people with a
terminal illness who have decided that th^r would be better off dead”. However, it
also presumes that these individuals make this decision when they are healthy and not
balancing a decision from the state o f ill health at the present time. This could
possibly undermine the utilitarian argument smce people might die when they do not
want to due to the presence o f an advance dfrective.
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The author’s main argument applies only to those directives which are made
by people who are in a healthy state and who wish the withdrawal o f life support in a
situation where their “inability to consent is potentially reversible”.
W hile the author is trying to provide a safety net for those who have written
advance directives, there are some problems with his argument. If an eighty-five year
old man is resuscitated so he can make a decision because his condition is potentially
reversible, it may take months or years for the person to reach that state; so we could
potentially have rooms full o f persons waiting to come around to make a decision
while the body deteriorates. Many directives made are also very specific as to the
treatments that should be withheld. They also specify that the directive may be used
only if the person is permanently unconscious or in a terminal state o f illness.
Therefore, I argue against Ryan by stating that in his argument the patient’s
right to make a decision regarding his health care is abolished. My other argument is
that even though a patient has a directive, that patient can rescind that directive at any
time prior to incompetence. In other words, a patient may have a directive when he
enters the hospital but he may change that directive at any tune after admission.
So while the use o f advance directives does have problems, many people have
been saved a life o f degradation because these directives have been honored by the
health care team involved in their care.
Case law is the subject o f the next chapter. If advance directives or a durable
power o f attorney for healthcare had be present, some o f these cases may have been
settled at the bedside and not in a courtroom.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE LAW
Everyone has the right to make decisions with regard to his or her medical
care whether to accept that care or refuse it. This issue was discussed in the previous
chapter. This right is derived from several sources: “(1) the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that no person will be ‘deprived o f liberty...without due process o f law’;
(2) the constitutional right to privacy; (3) the constitutional right to religious freedom;
and (4) the common law o f body integrity and self-determination and the doctrine o f
informed consenf’ (1).
These rights, however, are being curtailed by other interests such as the desire
to “1) preserve life, 2) to prevent suicide, 3) to protect thfrd parties, and 4) to
safeguard the integrity o f the medical profession”(2). In other words, outside
agencies, such as the ADA (American with Disabilities) or other persons are
attempting to become involved m making decisions regarding medical care for those
who are strangers to them. Some o f these groups regard withholding or withdrawing
treatment from patients as pro-euthanasia. The case law presented m this chapter
represents the different ways the Courts view medically inappropriate or medically
futile care.
The medical profession, particularly, does not wish to be accused o f making
decisions that would include passive euthanasia. Passive euthanasia could be defined
as withdrawing treatment from an individual who has a terminal condition or removal
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o f life support from a person who has no hope of survival and is in a comatose state.
Even though these are cases o f futility, we live in a highly litigious society where
“pulling the plug” if you will, could be considered a form o f euthanasia.
The Massachusetts high Court has found that there is a “critical distinction”
between insisting that life be sustained when an affliction is curable as opposed to the
state interest in preserving life where that ‘prolongation’ incurs a ‘traumatic cost’ for
the individual. The Court found in Eichner v. Dillon (1980) “that a terminally ill
patient maintained by life support has no health and in the true sense, no life for the
state to protecf’ 436 N.Y.S. 2d 517 (3).
Consider the case o f Baby K, an infant bom in October, 1992, in the state o f
Virginia. The infant was bom with anencephaly, a condition in which some portion
o f the brain stem is present, but the cerebral cortex, the largest part o f the brain, is
severely underdeveloped or absent. No treatment can correct this condition and Baby
K was blind, deaf and could not feel any pam. She could breathe and suck but she
remained in a permanent unconscious state. Many o f these infants die within a few
days after birth, but Baby K was resuscitated after birth and was placed on a
ventilator.
Hospital personnel, physicians, and nurses requested permission from the
mother to remove the ventilator, stating that the child would not live. The mother
refused and the hospital attempted to transfer Baby K to another hospital with a
neonatal mtensive care unit, but no other hospital would accept her as a patient. Her
mother cited her right to religious freedom to demand treatment. It was God’s choice
when the baby would die, not that o f the medical profession. The baby remamed in
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the hospital for six weeks and eventually was weaned from the ventilator, a process
where demand breathing is decreased for the patient and the patient will finally
breathe on his or her own.
The infant was readmitted twice more with respiratory distress and was placed
on a ventilator each time. Baby K received a tracheostomy (an opening into the
trachea to facilitate the passage o f air) in March, 1993. This procedure was still only
a measure to prolong her life. Health care professionals made repeated attempts to
dissuade the mother from asking for any more treatment that they considered futile.
The mother refused each time, stating that her religious belief required that all life
was considered sacred.
The hospital filed a suit with the United States District Court in Virginia,
asking if refusal to treat would be in violation o f any existing law. The hospital also
requested a Guardian Ad Litem. This is a court appointed person, made during the
course o f a proceeding, in order to protect the interests o f the alleged disabled minor.
The baby’s father and the Guardian Ad Litem agreed that all care was futile due to the
underlying condition o f the infant and agreed with the hospital that no further
ventilatory treatment be given. The Court cited three federal statutes that the hospital
would violate if it refused treatment to Baby K: I) the Emergency Treatment and
Labor Act (EMTALA), 2) The Rehabilitation Act o f 1973, and 3) the American with
Disabilities Act o f 1990 (ADA). The Court also ruled in favor o f Baby K’s mother,
citing Constitutional and common law principles, hi the Matter o f Babv K. 832F
Supp.1022 (ET). Va.19930) (4).
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EMTALA requires that a hospital treat anyone who enters that hospital
seeking emergency treatment in order to stabilize the condition o f that person. The
mother o f Baby K requested such treatment, since the baby was in respiratory
distress. The hospital argued such treatment was inhumane, considering the condition
o f the infant and requested an exception in this case.
The Court argued otherwise. It stated it is up to Congress, not the Court to
make an exception, and if any treatment would stabilize the baby's condition that it
be given, even though it is considered futile.
In regard to violation o f the Rehabilitation Act, the Court considered the baby
a handicapped person smce she was bom with a congenital defect Under Section
504 (o f the Rehabilitation Act o f 1973) it is unlawful for a recipient o f federal
financial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or
medical or surgical treatment to correct a life-threatening condition if: l)the
withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and 2)the handicap
does not render the treatment o f nutritional sustenance medically contraindicated (5).
The Court noted that refusal to treat Baby K by withholding the use o f a
ventilator would violate the ADA, since ventilatory support would be given to other
children if it were requested by their parents. The ADA prohibits discnmmation
against disabled persons m “public accommodations operated by private entities”
such as hospitals, (sec.301) (7) (F) (6).
The Court also found Constitutional and common law rights that prevent the
hospital from refosing treatment to Baby K. It focused on the right for parents to
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make medical decisions for their minor children. It also found that there is an explicit
guarantee o f a right to life in the United States and the Virginia Constitution.
The District Court rejected the right o f health care professionals to withhold
treatment in some cases, especially those cases when the parents opposed withholding
treatment.
Two opinions (somewhat narrow) were stated:
It is beyond the limits o f our judicial function to address moral and
ethical propriety o f providing emergaicy stabilizing medical treatment to
anencephalic infants. We are bound to interpret federal statutes in
accordance with their plain language and any expressed Congressional
intent.
.. .EMTALA does not carve out an exception for anœcephalic infants in
respiratory distress any more than it carves out an exception for comatose
patients, those with lung cancer or those with muscular dystrophy—all o f
whom may seek emergency stabilizing treatment o f respiratory distress
and also possess an underlying condition that severely affects their quality
o f life and ultimately result in their death. Official Report Citation, in the
matter of Baby K. (4Circ 1994). I6F.3d590@.598 (7).
The dissenting judge had a broader view of the case. EMTALA was intended
by Congress to prevent “dumping" o f patients from one hospital to another. A
hospital must treat a patient even if that patient is indigent. In other words, if an
indigent patient was in distress and requested treatment, treatment must be given and
the patient is stabilized before transfer to another facility. This judge did not interpret
EMTALA to mean that Congress should decide ethical and moral issues in medicine.
The hospital petitioned the United States Supreme Court and they refused to
hear the case. Baby K died before any other appeals could be made to the Courts, so
there was no legal resolution in this case. However, if Baby K had lived, she would
have had to be resuscitated on every admission to the hospital for the condition o f
respiratory distress.
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Another case where the Court ruled for the patient is that o f Helga Wanglie.
Wanglie fell and fractured her hip in December, 1989. The fracture was repaired and
she was discharged to a nursing home. While in the nursing home in January, 1990,
she went into respiratory distress, and was taken to a hospital where she was placed
on a ventilator. She was unable to be removed from the ventilator and was placed in
a facility that specialized in the care o f that type o f patient. While in that facility, she
had a heart attack and was resuscitated. She was deprived of oxygen for several
minutes and as a result, she was left in a persistent vegetative state.
There were repeated visits to the hospital for bouts o f pneumonia and
physicians made repeated attempts to have the family withhold any further treatment,
stating that any and all treatment in her case was futile. The family refused and the
hospital filed suit in the Court system o f Minnesota.
The New England Journal o f Medicine supported the hospital’s suit stating in
an editorial that “ the hospital’s pleas [was] bom o f realism not hubris...it advances
the claim that physicians should not be slaves to technology any more than the
patients should be its prisoners. They should be free to deliver and act on, an honest
and time-honored message: ‘Sorry, there’s nothing more we can do’” (8).
Mr. Wanglie filed a counter suit against the hospital smce the hospital no
longer wished to provide medically futile care. There was a hearing m May, 1991
before Probate Judge Patricia Belois. The physician consultant for the hospital. Dr.
Steven Miles, (the author o f many articles m the field o f bioethics) acknowledged that
family members are definitely the preferred surrogate for a patient in a persistent
vegetative state. However, he also stated:
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Physicians have a duty to overrule a family in certain circumstances and
that a doctor cannot be obligated to provide medical care that cannot
serve a patient’s personal interest (9).
The attorney appointed by the Court for Mrs. Wanglie stated that “he couldn’t
disagree with the family more, but I feel even more strongly that the right o f the
individual is paramount”(10).
The Court appointed Mr. Wanglie guardian for his wife and ruled in favor o f
the family. Mrs. Wanglie died shortly thereafter in July, 1991, o f multisystem failure.
In re Conversatorshin o f Wanelie. (No. PX-91-238 Minn. DistCt.) (11).
While the Courts mled favorably on behalf o f providing futile care in these
two cases, there have also been decisions in favor o f withholding or stopping lifesustaining treatment is other cases.
In the state o f Indiana, the Court ruled against the National Legal Center for
the Medically Dependent and Disabled (a pro-life group) in the case o f Sue Ann
Lawrence in 1991.
Lawrence had been in a debilitated state since suffering from a brain tumor in
childhood. As she grew older, her disabilities mcreased. When she fell from a wheel
chair in 1987, she lapsed into a persistent vegetative state. After a year in this state,
the family decided that life support should be withdrawn. They felt that Lawrence
would never recover and never have a chance for any kind o f life.
The National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and Disabled (a pro
life group) challenged this action. This organization cited the fact that Lawrence was
in a persistent vegetative state and therefore considered disabled. They further argued
that it would be a violation o f her basic human rights to withhold nutrition.
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The family agreed to resume the feedings until the Indiana Supreme Court
reached a decision. The Court ruled “that the family had the authority, without
judicial intervention, to stop any artificial nutrition.” Chief Justice Randall T.
Shepherd wrote, “The law o f the state permits the family to decide in consultation
with their physicians, that the tube feeding o f a loved one in a persistent vegetative
state should be ended.” In re Lawrence. 578 N B . 2d. 32 (Lid. 1991) (12).
The ethical principle o f autonomy was honored and the principle o f
substituted judgment was used. The parents felt that their daughter would not wish to
live in a persistent vegetative state.
The Courts also ruled in favor o f removing life support in the case o f Claire
Conroy. Conroy was an eighty-four year old resident o f a nursing home who had
lapsed into a persistent vegetative state. A nephew, who was her legal guardian,
petitioned the Court to remove life support The Court weighed the benefits o f
treatment, comparing them to the burdens imposed by those treatments,(e.g. “the
degree o f the treatment’s invasiveness, the degree o f humiliation, and the «ctent o f
uncontrollable discomfort or pain.”) The Court reviewed the case and agreed with the
nephew to stop life-sustainmg treatment, but Conroy’s court appointed attorney filed
an appeal.
In an Appellate decision, the New Jersey Court:
“equated artificial feedmg thru tubes with artificial breathing through
the use o f a respnrator, and ruled that naso-gastric tubes, gastrostomies
and mtravenous mfhsions.. .are medical procedures with inherent risks
and possible side effects, instituted by s l^ e d health professionals to
compensate for improved physical fimction. It further explained that
“once one enters the realm o f complex high-technology medical care,
it is hard to shed the emotional tymbolism o f food. However, artificial
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feedings are significantly different firom spoon-feeding. They are medical
procedures...and can be seen as the equivalent to artificial breathing.” h ire
Conrov. 98 N.J. 321,486 A 2 d 1209 (19085) (13).
All four o f these cases are ones in which there was no chance o f a cure nor
was there a chance o f a return o f any quality o f life. The death process was just being
prolonged by our advanced technology. Yet there are attorneys, judges, and other
groups with their own agendas in mind, who are afiraid to face reality with the dying
process. One cannot expect the human body to fimction forever. Granted there is
always hope, but in these four cases, there was no hope and the decisions should have
been made at the bedside and not in a courtroom. Hopefully, with the use o f the
Ethics Committees and increased communication, some o f these issues will be
resolved at the bedside. If perchance, one would view these cases with cost in mind,
there were not only medical costs o f sustaining a person with no quality o f life, but
there were legal costs as well.
Let me return to the problem with the ADA. The ADA was not written to
intrude into family concerns regarding medical care or to interfere with medical
decision-making. It was written to eliminate discriminatory as well as physical
barriers to the participation o f people with disabilities in employment, public services,
pubhc transportation, acconunodations and telecommunications. The ADA also
stresses independence in the disabled population. Yet, the portrayal o f a disabled
person is usually one o f a frail, elderly person who is chronically ill and “only
marginal to society”.
Many o f the h a n d ic ^ e d and disabled are truly frightened o f health
professionals not providing treatment to them if they become ill or withdrawing
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treatment just because they are handicapped and their life may not be considered
worth living. This is simply not realistic. Any person who enters a hospital
emergency department must be treated or it is a violation o f EMTALA. The hospital
will not withhold or withdraw treatment from a handicapped person until it has family
permission if the patient is unconscious. Each hospital has policies and procedures to
cover instances such as this. Therefore, it might behoove the ADA to spend money
educating the public and their own members that treatment will not be withheld from
those who are disabled or handicapped.
The futility issue is not about this population, it concerns those who lay in
hospital beds with no hope o f leaving the intensive care unit and those being in a
comatose state for the rest o f their lives. Therefore the ADA and other groups
previously mentioned who try to intervene in the cases brought to court should not try
to interfere in a family decision; but they, as an organization should become familiar
with the process used in hospitals when a treatment o f life support is being withdrawn
from a patient.
All the health care team members take each case of medically futile care
seriously while caring for the patient. No one is trying to end a life needlessly. But
as problems do develop, every effort should be made to solve them at the hospital
level instead o f in a courtroom.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We have now entered the year 2000, and the futili^ debate remains an issue
in bioethics. It is evident that some guidelines and decisions need to be discussed,
and public policy should be addressed. Medicine has progressed at a rapid rate since
the 1960’s when patients were allowed to die in peace and dignity, now, they are
poked, prodded, and invaded bodily, sometimes against their will, to avoid the
process o f death.
So, in review, we have covered the history o f medicine from primitive times
to modem times where the advancement o f high tech medical care is used to provide
futile care to the terminally ill, the elderly in multi-system failure, those in a persistent
vegetative state and neonates with severe anomalies or extremely low birth- weight.
I have supported the physiological definition o f futility as the one that should
be used in making decisions regarding futile care and my definition is: I f a treatment
cannot cure or provide a beneft to thefollowing population; the terminally ill; those
in a persistent vegetative state; the elderly in multi-system failure; or neonates with
no hope o f survival (those o f extremely low birthweight or those with severe
anomalies) then that treatment should not be provided andpalliative care should be
instituted. There are two types o f physiologicalfutility. First is the qualitative type o f
fittility that concerns the quality o f life ofthe patient. It is a treatment that renders a
patient permanently unconscious or thatpatient must rely on intensive carefor the
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rest o/Tiis life, that treatment may be consideredJUtile. In other words, that
unconscious patient will never wake up and the patient in intensive care cannot
survive outside the intensive care environment. Examples ofqualitativefutility would
be those who are in a persistent vegetative state with no quality o f life. The other type
ofphysiologicalfutility is classified as quantitative. If a treatment continuallyfails in
the last one hundred cases, then it could be consideredfutile. An example o f this type
o f futility could encompass the use o f CPR in the terminally ill and the elderly in
multi-system failure. largu e that these definitions, and the guidelines o f the Hastings
Centerfor applying these definitions should befollowed since the issue here is that of
providingfatile treatment to those who have no hope o f recovery.
The use of communication and trust combined with the ethical principles o f
justice, beneficence, non-malfeasance and autonomy are paramount in the decision
making process concerning the provision o f futile care, for without the use o f the
above principles, there can be no discussion among the physicians, staff and family.
It is o f utmost importance that we uphold these principles in the decision making
process.
The importance o f bavmg an advance directive (living will or durable power
o f attorney for healthcare) and how these directives are used to prevent providing
futile care has been discussed. The use o f these directives could prevent cases, such as
the ones presented m the case law section, finm bemg handled in a court o f law
instead o f at the bedside.
So, in conclusion, I would like to present the foUowmg six recommendations
that could lesson some o f the conflict m the futility debate. Each will be elaborated in
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in what follows.
1.

Education o f the public concerning the death and dying process,
focusing on the reasons why advanced medical technology should
not be used in certain cases.

2.

Mandatory education in medical school for physicians in
communication, ethics, and advance directives.

3.

Guidelines for the treatment o f neonates weighing less than
500 grams and those with severe anomalies not compatible
with life.

4.

Public policy to prevent interference from outside agencies
from interfering with family decision making concerning
the removal o f life-sustaining treatment.

5.

Public policy in the area o f pre-hospital resuscitation.

6.

Specific guidelines for withdrawing life support
such as those at Valley Hospital Medical Center should
be in place at every acute care hospital and long term care facility.

Patient Education:
The first issue that must be discussed in the education process o f the public is
to state that death is a natural process. It is an impossibility that anyone can live
forever. Yet, our culture with the use o f high tech medicine, seems to think that life
can last indefinitely. The public should face this issue with reality and not expect the
use o f high tech medicine to prolong life when that is not possible. This education
can be provided by those o f us who lecture m the community on the use o f advance
directives.
In 1994, there were approximately 14,000 mdividuals in a persistent
vegetative state being cared for in nursing homes and hospitals at the cost o f $50,000
to $100,000 per year, per person.(l) Specific guidelines should be in place
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concerning the use o f CPR for this population. There is no quality of life here and it
would be charitable to let a disease, usually pneumonia in this population, follow its
natural process into death, while providing the best possible pain management.
Can we continue to treat patients who have no knowledge of their
surroundings by using antibiotics to cure infections, feeding tubes for those who have
no knowledge that they are being fed, and having breathing tubes to help them
breathe? With the cost o f health care rising at an astronomical rate, will we be able to
continue to funnel health care dollars to this population? And will this population be
able to continue to be admitted to an acute care hospital for a diagnosis o f sepsis or to
receive a blood transfusion for internal bleeding? The answer is no, because it is
becoming too costly. I believe that health care dollars to those in a persistent
vegetative state will be reduced and admission to an acute care facility will be denied,
so this population will be directly affected by fiitility, one way or another.
It would be advantageous for the American people to come together at a
grassroots level, possibly as a community project, to discuss these problems, not only
among themselves, but also with physicians, attorneys, and those persons who have
knowledge o f bioethics. Also included in this group should be acute care and long
term care administrators. This community group could research and discuss these
issues, come to a decision and then present them to public policy makers.
Mandatorv Education in Medical Schools:
Education in communication should be mandatory for those attending medical
school. Many physicians cannot or do not know how to communicate with families.
If physicians do not communicate with families, patients and staf^ t h ^ w ül not earn
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the trust that is so extremely important and so sorely needed in the medical profession
today. Classes on death and dying should be mandatory for physicians rather than be
an elective that is canceled due to a lack o f interest Attendance at these classes could
possibly be a benefit to physicians’ level o f comfort concerning this subject.
Physicians also need to learn how to be articulate in the use of advance directives.
Medical school education in this area would be especially helpful to those physicians
going into family practice so they could initiate the use o f advance directives in their
offices.
Guidelines for Neonates:

Specific guidelines should be discussed and put in place regarding the
resuscitation o f a neonate who weighs less than SOOgrams or one who is so
profoundly handicapped with severe congenital anomalies that there is no hope of
recovery. These infants caimot speak; therefore, we have no idea o f the amount of
pain they are suffering.
The guidelines from the GUIDe group should be adopted by all hospitals that
have a neonatal intensive care unit. These guidelines are as follows:
Lethal birth conditions affect only a small number of newborns.
In this context, the word lethal implies that death is ecpected to
occur in infancy. Examples o f conditions mcluded in this group
are: Trisomy 13 or Trisomy 18, requning life support, renal
agensis, anencephaly, and thanatophoric dwarfism.
Supportive care is provided for all babies. This includes family contact,
oral feedmgs, hospice or home care when possible, as well as warmth
and pain control. Medical professionals will provide qipropriate
pain control with these patients, even though some medications
carry risks, mcludmg respiratory or cardiac arrest
Intermediate care decisions are best made by the baby’s family in
consultation with the professional caregwers. Examples o f
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întermedîate care are intravenous fluids (IV), oral medications,
supplemental oxygen, and nasogastric tube feedings.
Aggressive care for these babies is inappropriate. Examples o f
aggressive care can include ventilator support, medications to
maintain vital signs, CPR, total IV nutrition and gastrostomy tubes.
A physician in the delivery room may be able to make a diagnosis
o f a lethal condition. In these cases it would be appropriate not to
institute ventilator support. In cases in which the professional
caregiver is not smre o f the delivery room diagnosis, it is
appropriate to begin aggressive intervention^ obtain the proper
studies and then withdraw the intervention if the diagnosis o f a lethal
condition is confirmed.
Bereaved families deserve the highest level o f human support,
one that recognizes cultinral, ethnic and religious difîërences.(2)
At the present time. Valley Hospital is forming a committee to address these
guidelines for use in our neonatal intensive care unit If these guidelines had been in
place, the Baby K case probably would have never been presented in court. The
absence o f guidelines must be remedied.
Public Policv for Outside Agencies:
Policy defining the specified role o f the ADA (i.e. discrimination on the basis
o f a disability for a person to perform “essential” job functions with or without
reasonable accoimnodation) should also be in place to prevent any lawsuits firom such
agencies as the ADA and the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and
Disabled against families who wish life support withdrawn firom loved ones because
there is no quality o f life for them (3). One must remember that this population is, if
you w in, fed, watered and turned. However, these agencies look upon those in a
persistent vegetative state as handicapped.
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There are other causes for the ADA and the National Legal Center for the
Medically Dependent and Disabled to defend. In these cases, I argue that they should
defer to the families who wish to withhold or withdraw treatment from their family
member. These agencies may not realize the burdens placed on the families, not only
financially but also, emotionally.
There may be a time, if policy is not made, that these agencies may not only
pick and choose those they wish to save, but will advance toward acute care hospitals
and try to involve themselves in every case. Granted this probably would not happen,
but there is always the possibility. An example of such a policy that could be
initiated is for the ADA not to interfere in family decisions regarding fiitile care.
Public Policv for Pre-hospital Resuscitation:
When CPR was instituted as a life-saving measure, it was a wondrous thing
and in some cases it did save lives. Yet, while it was a well meaning procedure, the
use o f CPR left some o f our population in a persistent vegetative state. Mental
hospitals in the 1960’s had wards where those in a persistent vegetative state were
cared for. When one entered such a ward as the one in Norristown State Hospital in
Pennsylvania, one observed beds containing persons in a fetal position. The patients’
arms, legs and fingers were contracted. Their hair was sparse and dry, their eyes were
open and moving side to side but unfocused. They had movements but none were
purposeful. Many would remam in this state for years to come. Now in the year
2000, CPR combined with Advanced Cardiac Life Support (CPR combined with
drugs and mtubation) has saved more lives than in the I960’s. But, there are many
who are left in that ‘no-mans land’ o f existing, not living.
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Public policy in the area of pre-hospital resuscitation should be addressed and
quickly. One must remember that when a person’s breathing stops or a heart ceases
to beat, others in the home become frightened and call an ambulance even though
they (the patient) want nothing done, hi the state o f Nevada and some other states, it
is the law that a person must be resuscitated when the paramedics arrive unless
written evidence is presented that the patient has an advance directive. Seventeen
states do have laws that allow a paramedic not to resuscitate a person when the
ambulance arrives. These laws cover the cases o f the elderly person as well as those
who are terminally ill and those people who stand little or no chance o f surviving
resuscitation. Laws such as these would also have an impact on the overall cost o f
medical care; therefore, Nevada and the thirty-two other states without such
provisions should enact them.
So, such a policy would state that whenever a person had signed a Do Not
Resuscitate paper, the paramedics would lawfully have to honor that paper, even
though the family objected. Another part o f the policy would allow the paramedics
not to resuscitate a person who is terminally ill, an elderly person or one who stands
little chance of surviving resuscitation. Again, the public needs education in this area
to support such legislation.
Specific Guidelines for Withholding and With<frawmg Treatment:
Specific guidelines for withdrawmg or withholding life support should be in
place at every acute care hospital and every long term care facility.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

76

All medical facilities must recognize the right o f every patient to accept or
refuse medical care even if it ends his/her life. Decisions to forego treatment are
guided by the benefits/burdens principle. If the treatment has no benefits for the
patient and the burdens become unbearable, then ethically that treatment does not
need to be provided.
If death results finm the withholding or withdrawing o f treatment, it does not
constitute a suicide or homicide.(NRS449.650#l) There is no moral or legal
obligation to provide fiitile treatment. The physician is not mandated by law to
provide futile treatment. If futile treatment is withheld or withdrawn, then palliative
care is provided. These are only a few o f the guidelines. The entire policy is in the
appendix.
In conclusion, medical futility according to a physiological definition does
exist, but fiitile care is practiced in hospitals and long term care facilities every day. I
argue that this care should not be provided to the population firequently mentioned in
this thesis. I cannot stress enough the importance o f communication in cases o f
medical futility and how dialogue with one another can make a difference. But, if the
recommendations presented above, combined with a grassroots movement and town
meetings were discussed and presented through the proper legal channels, they could
be used in hospitals. Emergency Medical Systems, and so could withstand the
litigious scrutiny o f today’s legal system. These guidelines and recommendations
would also solve some o f the dilemmas o f ‘medical futility’ that are present in society
today.
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